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1.1 Introduction 
Who owns the assets in  the defined-benefit pension plans of  corpora- 
tions? Some may feel that this question is easy to answer: pension funds 
are legal  entities separate from the corporation. This distinction  was 
made more explicit  with the enactment of  the Employees Retirement 
Income Security Act of  1974 (ERISA). The provisions of  the Act reg- 
ulate the funding and investments of  the fund as well as the benefits to 
employees.  In  addition, the  Pension  Benefit  Guaranty  Corporation 
(PBGC), which guarantees a level of  benefits for employees, has the 
power to tax the corporation to secure the payment of  pension benefits. 
The firm contributes to the pension plan, the administrators of  the plan 
have  responsibilities  as  other fiduciaries,  and  the  employees  receive 
benefits from the pension plan during their years in retirement. Although 
prior to the Act, employers had easier access to the assets of  the fund, 
greater control over the funding and investing decisions, and could use 
the assets for corporate purposes, the provisions of the Act closed many 
routes to the assets of  the fund. 
Pension plans are too large and are growing too fast, however, for 
economists to be stopped by the literal description of  the pension plan or 
for  them  not  to  try  to strip away  the  legal  form  and  to  reveal  the 
economics of defined-benefit pension plans. As explained in Bulow et al. 
(1983), there have  been  significant  changes  in  the economics  of  the 
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defined-benefit pension plan subsequent to the passage of ERISA. Cur- 
rently, pension assets in all plans exceed $600 billion, while the assets in 
noninsured  private pension plans exceed $300 billion.  In recent  years, 
pension contributions for Fortune 500 companies have averaged approx- 
imately  12% of  pretax profits. These funds represent a large pool of 
assets: to define ownership to these assets is  an important task. 
Understanding the ownership of  defined-benefit pension funds, how- 
ever, is difficult. Early papers in the area by Sharpe (1976), Treynor et al. 
(1976), and Treynor (1977) considered that the pension trust was essen- 
tially an asset of the corporation. The liabilities to the employees were 
classified as essentially corporate obligations. Black  (1976) argued that 
most of  the risk  of  holding  assets in a defined-benefit  pension  plan  is 
borne  by  corporate stockholders. Bulow  (1981)  has  argued  that  the 
pension promise is comparable to a discount bond: the current reduction 
in salary is the present value of  the bond, and the future promise is the 
face amount of  the bond. As a first  approximation, the value  of  the 
corporate pension  liability  would  then  be  only  the accrued  benefits, 
benefits that must  be paid  if  the plan were terminated immediately. 
Sharpe (1976),  assuming  a no-tax  world.  argued  that  it made  little 
difference to the stockholders or the pension beneficiaries how the assets 
of  the pension fund were allocated between bond and stock investments. 
With rational expectations neither group would expect to fool the other. 
Black (1980), Feldstein and Seligman (1981), and Teppcr (1981) assume 
that retirement promises to employees are corporate liabilities with little 
risk and, most important. promises that are independent of  the pension 
fund, in concluding that there were tax advantages to corporate stock- 
holders of  investing the assets of pension  funds in bonds. 
There are, however, flaws in this argument on  various fronts, including 
the tax  front. Sharpe and Harrison (1982)  argue  that  with  insurance 
provided by the PBGC and with taxation, the policy of the fund may shift 
toward either all stocks or all bonds within the fund. Miller and Scholes 
(1981) and Bulow (1982) argued that the pension claims of the employees 
were not independent of  the value of the assets of  the fund; some groups 
of employees  consider that the assets in the defined-benefit plan belong to 
them, just as if the plan were a defined-contribution plan. Depending on 
the question  to be  answered, economists have assumed  that  different 
parties owned the pension fund. 
In the last  several  years,  however, many  financial economists  have 
come to  the view  that  the pension  plan  of  a large  corporation is  a 
corporate asset and the obligation to pay employees during retirement a 
corporate liability. This argument seems reasonable, since beneficiaries 
of a defined-benefit pension plan receive a pension based, in part, upon a 
percentage of their final salary with the firm, or receive a pension based 
on a fixed dollar amount multiplied by up to a maximum number of  years 
of service with  the firm. Although as a legal entity the pension  fund is 19  Who Owns the Assets in a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan? 
separate from the firm, employees look to the firm to pay their retirement 
benefits. These payments, therefore, have been assumed to be obliga- 
tions of the corporation, promises to  pay benefits to employees, similar in 
economic effect to promises to its other creditors. If benefits received by 
the employees are independent of the performance of the of  the fund, or 
its assets, then the assets of the firm include the assets of the pension plan: 
both are the security for the pension claim. Tepper (1981) assumes this 
independence by treating the assets and liabilities of the pension fund no 
differently than assets and liabilities held on corporate account in con- 
structing an augmented balance sheet of  a corporation. 
We want to contribute to the discussion of  the issues in several ways. In 
the first section we discuss the implications of  interpreting literally the 
provisions of a defined-benefit pension plan. Such an interpretation  leads 
to some implausible conclusions even if  the method used to account for 
pension benefits is the most consistent with accounting for other forms of 
employee compensation. These inconsistencies imply that when valuing 
the employee’s claims on the pension fund it is necessary to look beyond 
the literal description of the compensation agreement. 
In the second section of the chapter, we explore what can be learned 
from the form of the pension contract about the nature of compensation 
to the group of  employees within  the firm. The traditional view that 
stockholders  set up forms of “implicit contracts” is rejected for the view 
that employees,  within the salaried pension plan, should be looked at not 
as individuals but as a group. The group negotiates with the stockholders 
of  the firm (the board of directors of  the firm or its management repre- 
sentatives) over the division of  the profits earned by the firm. 
By  considering the workers  as members of  a group, many  of  the 
anomalies  considered  in  the first part of  the chapter disappear. We 
conclude that viewing the pension fund and the corporate assets of a firm 
as a single consolidated account is too simplistic. 
1.2  Who Owns the Pension Fund? A Dogmatic View 
of the Pension Covenants 
At the start, we will consider only defined-benefit  pension plans for 
salaried employees. Such plans are almost always well funded: if the plan 
were to terminate today, assets would be more than sufficient to assure all 
of the accrued vested benefits of the employees in the plan. As employees 
leave the firm, their pension wealth in the plan could be calculated easily 
by  taking the present value of  their vested  benefits. As Bulow (1982) 
shows, the present  value  of  vested  benefits is the correct measure of 
pension wealth under either of  two models of labor compensation: (1) a 
“marginal product model” and (2) an “orthogonal model.” 
In a marginal product model, an employee’s total compensation each 
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ployee leaves or stays with the firm. It would be extremely tenuous to 
argue that the present value of  the employees’ vested benefits is not the 
correct measure of  the employer’s  liability: future benefit accumulation is 
part of future compensation and is paid for by providing future services to 
the firm. 
In an orthogonal model, the form of  the pension plan is assumed to be 
independent of  any deviations between  employee compensation  and 
their marginal product. Some recent work (e.g., Medoff and Abraham 
1980 ) indicates that, after correcting for differences in marginal product, 
older workers may be paid more than younger workers. This does not 
mean, however, that these differences need be related in any way to the 
form  of  the  pension  plan.  Stanford,  for  example,  has  a  defined- 
contribution pension plan, yet it may be as “paternalistic” as Sunstrand 
Corporation with  its defined-benefit plan. In both organizations, the 
young workers may be underpaid and the old workers might be overpaid. 
No one, however, would suggest that Stanford calculate a “projected 
liability”  representing the amount of  compensation the school will have 
to pay in excess of  the present value of the future output of  the employee, 
even though under the tenure system those liabilities are more explicit 
than those of  a private firm. 
For firms with defined-benefit pension plans, it does not make sense to 
calculate an implicit pension liability using projections of  future salary 
scales and termination rates. In computing the liability of  the firm to the 
beneficiaries of  the plan, the liability  should be no greater than the 
liability on terminating the pension fund. The liability should be unre- 
lated to the form of  the pension plan, whether the plan is of  the defined- 
benefit  or the defined-contribution type.  Furthermore, since pension 
benefits represent less than 10% of  total labor compensation, the calcula- 
tion of  a liability for implicit compensation by  only using pension data 
would be subject to large errors in measurement. 
Using these arguments, actuaries are justified in setting the value of the 
employees’ pension equal to the present value of  vested benefits, the 
benefits they retain on leaving the firm immediately. These are exactly 
the same benefits that employees would receive on the termination of a 
well-funded pension plan. 
1.2.1  Anomalies in the Accrued-Benefit Method of Accounting 
for Pension Liabilities 
We have found several ways, however, that accounting for pension 
wealth in this manner fails to reflect the present value of  an employee’s 
pension wealth. These anomalies make it difficult to accept the accrued- 
benefit method in total, without question or adjustments. 
The anomalies that we have found that are most interesting include the 
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a)  Vesting occurs on discrete dates. Until employees vest, they have no 
pension wealth; on “vesting day,” however, their entire accrued benefits 
become part of their pension wealth. Under ERISA, in the most extreme 
form of  vesting,  if employees leave the firm with less that 10 years of 
service, they have no pension;  however, after 10 years they are fully 
vested. No one would believe that employees accumulate their entire 10 
years of  pension wealth on the final day before vesting. Although this 
appears to be a serious deficiency, it is not as important as it might seem: 
the present value of the benefit is generally less than a few weeks’ pay for 
a newly vested employee who is about 40 years old. If  need be, the firm 
could pay salary that was fractionally  less during the last year before 
vesting,  knowing  that the employee  will  consider  loss of  pension  in 
deciding whether to stay with the firm. 
Although the employee may receive salary that is independent of  the 
day of vesting, this bonus is too small to invalidate using vested benefits as 
a proxy for pension wealth. We have better candidates to challenge the 
vested-benefit approach to valuing the pension benefit. 
b)  EarZy  retirement benefits. Employees receive large lump sum bene- 
fits by  remaining with the firm until the first date of  early retirement. 
Many plans allow employees to retire early with benefits that are too high 
relative to the benefits received on remaining with the firm until normal 
retirement. For example, a plan may have the following provisions: (1) If 
the employee leaves before the early retirement date (e.g., age 59,  the 
employee is eligible for a vested pension with benefits beginning at age 
65; (2) if the employee stays until the early retirement date, the employee 
is eligible for perhaps 70% of a full pension, starting immediately; and (3) 
by  staying until the early retirement  date, the employee may become 
eligible for extended health benefits and periodic upward adjustments  in 
pension benefits which are lost by those employees leaving the firm prior 
to the early retirement date. The employee’s incentive to stay with the 
firm until the early retirement date may exceed one full year’s salary. 
Staying until early retirement has a dramatic effect on the employee’s 
pension  wealth.  Looking  strictly  at  vested  benefits  as  a  measure  of 
pension  wealth  fails to account for the large jump on that one day. 
Employees  may  receive  quite  a few  lump sum benefits  during their 
careers, but none comparable to the gain achievable by staying with the 
firm until the date of early retirement. Clearly, those employees, soon to 
become eligible for early retirement, have substantial equity beyond their 
vested benefits (the benefits they would receive on leaving the firm before 
this important date). 
To preserve comparability to the manner in which we account for other 
items, we still might choose to account for early retirement as a one-time 
windfall that is realized on reaching the date of retirement. For example, 
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attending college; that item is expensed  and not  accrued throughout 
employment. Employees, however, do not de facto have such large lump 
sums payment as part of their compensation. 
Early retirement provisions may in part be substitutes for severance 
pay. That is, employees who are fired before the date of early retirement 
might  have  a  more generous severance  arrangement than  their  col- 
leagues.  The early  retirement  date would  still  serve  as a  significant 
milestone; after that date, the employee would receive severance pay 
through pension  in  lieu  of  severance on retiring voluntarily.  (Lazear 
[1982] has worked on a closely related question.) 
c)  Lump sum distributions. Lump sum distributions from pension plans 
have a significant effect on pension wealth. Many pension plans permit 
some or all retirees to take their pensions in a lump sum, with promised 
benefits that are discounted at low rates of interest. According to a recent 
survey, 90 of  the 546 companies surveyed offered lump sum payment 
options while only assuming rates of  interest that averaged around 6% 
(New York Times, April 5, 1981). 
By using low rates of  interest, the lump sum distribution has greater 
present value than receiving the pension through time. Therefore, at all 
dates prior to retirement, accrued benefits would be the present value of 
the lump  sum.  This has an interesting side effect: if the firm also uses a low 
rate of  interest in valuing pension liabilities, then its book liability equals 
its literal valuation liability. There are, however, two major problems 
with this approach. 
First, firms have a large degree of flexibility in changing the interest 
rate used in determining the lump sum. It may seem implausible that a 
firm could reduce the present value of its pension liabilities unilaterally by 
as much as 25% by changing its assumption on interest rates from 6% to 
9%. Yet Texaco, American Airlines, and RCA Corporation are among 
corporations that have raised their interest rate in recent years, to the 
consternation of retiring employees (Pensions and Znvesrmenr Age, May 
10, 1982). 
Second, firms have the power to decide whether a specific employee 
will be permitted to  receive a lump sum benefit. For example, some plans 
make it easier for high-level executives, deemed to possess more financial 
acumen, to  receive lump sums. At this stage of the analysis, however, it is 
puzzling that employees would give the firm so much discretion over the 
present value of their benefits. The vested benefit method of valuation 
does not allow for discretion of  this type. 
d)  Ad  hoe increases in benefits. Ad hoc increases in the benefits of 
pensioners  appear  to  be  a  corporate  giveaway.  The  vested-benefit 
method of  valuation of  pension benefits requires that future promises be 
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retired employees. These grants, made at random times during retire- 
ment, do  not fit the vested-benefit approach to defining pension wealth. 
e)  Claims on pension assets. The stockholders have an equity position 
in the pension fund at least equal to the market value of the assets in the 
pension fund minus the present value of  the liabilities of the fund. In 
addition, if the right to  put the liabilities to the PBGC, the “pension put,” 
has value, the stockholders have a more valuable claim. On the other 
hand, if  the pension  put has no value,  a well-funded  plan, then the 
stockholders are the sole gainers (losers) from increases (decreases) in 
the market value of  the pension fund. The stockholders, not  the em- 
ployees,  are concerned with the “wasting” of  excess assets in a well- 
funded pension plan. 
Yet recent events indicate that this clear separation of  the claims on the 
assets in the plan is incorrect. For example, retirees of Grumman Cor- 
poration, not the stockholders, sued the trustees of  the pension plan for 
wasting the assets of  the pension fund by buying stock at a premium, 
presumably  to prevent a takeover by LTV. With a vastly overfunded 
pension  plan, it  appears that the retirees were  not  injured; only the 
stockholders  were hurt if  they missed an opportunity to sell their stock at 
a higher price and if paying the premium was a waste of the excess assets 
of  the plan. The benefits of retirees were still safe, and active workers 
may have been better off because their own pensions remained intact and 
their jobs may have become safer because of the antitakeover activity. 
Also, under ERISA, the assets of  the plan are to be managed for the 
sole benefit of the beneficiaries of the plan. The courts appear to follow 
this interpretation in defining the claimants to the assets of the plan. The 
Grumman case points to the difficulty in using the excess assets in the plan 
for corporate business purposes. 
In another related case, the A&P Corporation terminated its pension 
plan. After negotiating with the union, and although no contract specified 
a division of the surplus, the surplus in the pension fund apparently will 
be split into two parts, with a substantial fraction going to the employees 
through increased benefits. 
These anomalies  lead us to conclude that the vested-benefit method for 
valuation of pension benefits does not give a complete picture. In actual- 
ity, employees have complex employment contracts with the firm, and 
the pension plan  is  only part of  total  compensation.  To  understand 
pension compensation, in addition to direct salary, we must also under- 
stand the various other aspects of the compensation package. 
In the next section of  the chapter we discuss a model of compensation 
that tries to explain how a firm could offer a compensation package that 
includes lumpy payments, such as the large bonus for staying until the 
date of early retirement.  This analysis, we believe, gives us an insight into 24  Jeremy I. BulowlMyron  S. Scholes 
the nature of  the claims of  both the employees  and the stockholders 
against the pension fund. 
1.3 A Mode1 of Labor Contracts 
In the last section we showed that anomalies arise if we value pension 
benefits as termination benefits. In this section, we present an alternative 
model of  the labor contract  that reconciles many of  these anomalies. 
We eschew the standard “implicit  contract” approach to labor rela- 
tions,  an approach where  young  workers are paid  less than  marginal 
product and old workers are paid more than marginal product because of 
some unwritten pact between the firm and the workers. Although some 
of  the implicit  contract models  explaining  the  upward-sloping  wage/ 
tenure profile  have  been  ingenious,  such  as the work  by  Harris and 
Holmstrom (1982), they typically depend on the firm honoring a noncon- 
tractual obligation to the employees. (Lazear [1979] has also contributed 
to this literature.) In a model such as Harris and Holmstrom‘s, it must be 
in the interest of the firm to renege on its implicit liabilities at some point, 
unless those liabilities can grow indefinitely by  at least the interest rate 
(a possible  Ponzi scheme). Although we present  a model in which we 
expect  to observe an upward-sloping  wagehenure profile,  there is  no 
reliance on an implicit labor contract. 
In this model we study firms earning economic rents that, in part, go to 
the labor force. The labor force is able to extract some rents because the 
employees have developed some human capital specific to the firm. The 
firm  cannot earn its rents without  employing the workers, who  have 
experience with the firm and who educate new and inexperienced work- 
ers. Each generation of workers is willing to take a low wage when young 
to gain  experience  and to become part of  the group that  negotiates  a 
larger total wage bill. The older workers are essentially equity holders in 
the firm, and they sell their equity to the young workers. The sale takes 
place through differential  wage  rates: it cannot occur through  sale to 
stockholders.  There is no claim that can be sold in the market. 
No generation of employees gets what is ex ante better than a fair deal; 
there is no queue for employment with the firm. Individual employees, 
however, accept low salaries because they are buying equity from other 
employees-not  because of an implicit contract with the firm. The senior 
members of  the organization, who  at  any moment possess  the rents 
accruing to the labor force, are able to do as well via high salaries when 
old as they would if they could suddenly disembody the rents of the labor 
force and sell all future rents for their present value. 
We distinguish three types of  human capital. The first is fully transfer- 
able human capital, for example, the knowledge gained in earning an 
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example, an administrator who knows a tremendous amount about a 
particular company, with some of these skills not easily or at least quickly 
replicated at the firm. Third is firm-specific human capital, not unique to a 
particular individual and therefore shadow priced at the margin at zero. 
Although, if one employee leaves the firm, there is no loss in  that the 
employee’s marginal product is as high inside the firm as outside the firm, 
if a whole group of such employees left the firm all at once, there would be 
a loss to the firm. It is this third type of group human capital that we use in 
the model. Empirically, if we could observe the marginal product of these 
employees individually, it would be low. The marginal product of  the 
group, however, is high. If employees negotiate their compensation as a 
group, either explicitly through union negotiations or implicitly through a 
management team, they are able to garner part of the “quasi” rents that 
are earned because of the firm-specific human capital of the group. 
To illustrate these ideas and the concepts, we use a simple model and a 
numerical example. This will lead into our discussion of the ownership of 
the assets of the pension plan. 
Assume that a firm is created that will last for four periods exactly and 
that the production function each period is as follows: 
f(q,, qE) = 120 qE’+  40 qI3‘-  192 
where qE  = quantity of experienced employees and qI = quantity of  inex- 
perienced employees. 
Assume that these employees only develop firm-specific human capi- 
tal. The opportunity cost of working for the firm is the same regardless of 
the experience of  the employee. For the purposes of the model, assume 
that in each period, W,  the opportunity cost of  each worker is 15. 
Assume that no individual employee can be employed for more than 
two periods-one  when inexperienced and one when experienced. In the 
first period there are no workers with experience. Finally, assume that 
the rate of  interest, r, is  100%. 
It can  be shown that optimal employment would  involve  hiring  16 
inexperienced employees in  the first period and employing  16 experi- 
enced and 16 inexperienced employees in  each of  periods 2, 3, and 4. 
Under those circumstances, the marginal product of both experienced 
and  inexperienced  employees  will  be  15 (the market wage)  in  each 
period. The net present value of  the project will be zero. 
If individual employees acted as price takers, then all employees could 
receive a wage of 15 in every period. However, if the employees are able 
to negotiate their salaries as a group, they will be in a bilateral bargaining 
position with the stockholders of  the firm (presumably through the board 
of  directors or their representatives),  and the experienced employees 
may be able to negotiate a higher level of  compensation in period 1, 2, 
or 3. 26  Jeremy I. Bulow/Myron S. Scholes 
For example, in period 4 the total income produced by the firm would 
be  120(  16)" + 40( 16)" -  192 = 608.  From  this  amount, each  inexperi- 
enced employee would have to be paid 15 in a competitive labor market. 
The experienced employees, however, conceivably could negotiate any 
amount of salary between 15, at which level they would be indifferent to 
staying with the firm, and 23, at which level the stockholders would be 
indifferent to shutting down the firm. 
Any assumption can be made about the expectations of the employees 
of how the bilateral negotiations for salary will be resolved in periods 2,3, 
and 4. We can then calculate the expected  total compensation  of  em- 
ployees in  each future period, the distribution  of  total  compensation 
between  experienced  and  inexperienced  employees  in  each  future 
period, and the salary that will have to be paid in the first period. For 
example, assume that everyone expects that in each period the employees 
will negotiate a compensation package under which they receive 25% of 
the rents earned by the firm. In each period, the opportunity cost of the 32 
employees is 480 and the firm has gross income of  608; therefore, we 
assume that all parties expect the total compensation of the employees in 
the last three periods will be 480 + .25 ( 608 -  480 ), or 512. 
In  period 4, inexperienced  employees  will  command a wage  of  15 
each.  Therefore,  the  experienced  employees  will  each  receive 
[512 -  (16 x 15)]/16 = 17. In  period  3, the inexperienced  employees, 
expecting that they will receive 17 when old, will settle for a wage of  14 
when young: the present value of their compensation will be the same as 
with a wage of  15 each year. Continuing backward, we  can compute a 
table, as in table 1.1, of the expected salaries of the experienced and the 
inexperienced  employees. 
Because young employees expect to earn 18.50 in period 2 when they 
acquire experience, they will settle for 13.25 in period  1, which is  1.75 
below the market salary. Given the wage in period  1 and the expected 
wage bill in periods 2.3, and 4, the firm regards the investment as a zero 
net present value project. Instead, if in each period the firm were to pay 
market salaries to all of its employees, it would have cash flows of -  112, 
+ 128. + 128. and + 128. Because the stockholders must bargain with the 
employees in periods  1, 2, and 3, their expected share of the cash flows 
Table  1.1  Expected Salaries of  Experienced and Inexperienced Employees 
Period  Experienccd  Inexperienced 
2  18.50  13.so 
3  18.00  14.00 
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falls to +96 (75% of 128). Naturally the lower salary that the employees 
accept in  the start-up phase of  the enterprise  reduces the initial  cash 
outflow in that period from 112 to 84. 
Essentially, in period 1 the inexperienced employees make an invest- 
ment that is equal to 25% of the equity of the firm. At the end of the 
start-up phase of the enterprise, the firm will have a market value equal to 
only three-quarters of  what it would be if the employees had no equity 
participation (loosely speaking, Tobin’s q would be less than one). 
The inexperienced employees settle for a salary of 13.25, which is 1.74 
below the market salary, because they expect to earn an extra 3.50 the 
following period. Of  this extra amount, 2.00 comes from the 32.00 in 
rents that are split among the 16 experienced employees, and 1.50 comes 
from selling the present value of their future share of the rents of the firms 
to the new young employees. 
In the context of this model, representatives of the stockholders negoti- 
ate a total salary bill with the employee group. There are no implicit labor 
contracts-management  and the employees are expected to negotiate as 
hard in each and every period. Nevertheless, there are some employees, 
generally the young and inexperienced, whose salaries are less than their 
marginal product, and some employees, generally the more senior and 
experienced, whose salaries are greater than their marginal product. 
The model assumes that the employee group acquires an equity posi- 
tion  within  the firm, and the model assumes that they  can  sell these 
property rights only to new employees entering the firm. In the start-up 
phase of the firm, both the stockholders and the employee group might 
have provided the investment capital-the  stockholders with direct in- 
vestments,  the employee group with reduced  salaries. The firm earns 
rents that are shared over time through higher “dividends” to the em- 
ployee group. 
In this model of group compensation, we could observe large lumps of 
salary to selected members of  the employee group at particular times, 
such as  staying with the firm until early retirement day or receiving tuition 
for children attending college. As long as the total compensation bill is in 
line with previous negotiations, the stockholders do not object to paying 
a disproportionate amount to any one employee. Individual employees, 
therefore, need not worry about the stockholders trying to reduce their 
salaries at times when they become eligible to receive significant em- 
ployee benefits. 
While this model does not in itself explain why compensation should be 
parceled out in any particular form-it  is hard to justify tuition benefits at 
universities without considering that in part these benefits are tax-exempt 
income-the  model does open the door for individual compensation not 
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In the next section, we discuss the implications of the model to answer- 
ing the question of  who owns the assets of a pension plan. The notion that 
the employee group has an equity share in the firm, a share that is sold to 
younger  employees  through  a  salary  reduction  plan,  is  important. 
Although this is equivalent to paying higher salaries to older workers, it 
separates  the  implicit  contract notion from our notion  of  an equity 
participation. 
1.4 Who Owns the Assets in a Defined-Benefit Pension Fund? 
In  the model above, the employees  of  the firm  negotiate  with  the 
employer for a total compensation  package and allocate compensation 
among members of  the group according to marginal  product, returns 
from previous equity investments, and purchases and sales of claims of 
the equity of  the firm. 
There are three important implications of this model for the ownership 
of the assets of the pension fund. First, the model appears to justify using 
defined-benefit pension plans. Under these plans, the present value of the 
pension accruals of the experienced, older employees is far greater than 
that of the accruals of the inexperienced, younger employees. If younger 
employees are buying the equity rights of  older employees, a pension 
plan that skews pension savings to older employees might be preferred by 
both groups. Under a defined-contribution plan, however, employers are 
constrained  to tie pension  compensation  to salary and not to make it 
directly dependent on age. The defined-benefit plan allows the younger 
employees to pay for equity shares at a slower rate, which they might 
prefer, and allows the older employees to defer, at the before-tax rate, 
the returns on the equity  shares in  the firm.  Second, employers can 
aggregate over the many employees in the plan, to compute the liability 
of the firm, even if the individual’s estimates of their own pension wealth 
do  not aggregate to these totals. That is, the labor model does not require 
that  individual employees be paid  anything close to marginal  product 
each period. The University of Chicago accounts, and reasonably at that, 
for the cost of its tuition benefit program by expensing the cash outlay 
each year. Individual employees, however, may include, and rightly so, 
some accrued tuition benefit wealth on their own personal balance sheets. 
To reconcile  this seeming  inconsistency,  consider  that  the  employee 
group owns part of the surplus generated by  the university; employees 
with  children  approaching  college  age know that when  their children 
become undergraduates, the university,  acting  as the agent, will  give 
them a disproportionate share of the employee surplus. This allocation 
would be entirely consistent with how the employee group had deter- 
mined to allocate the surplus among themselves. Similarly, in the pension 
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therefore will  have sharply increased  vested  benefits,  means that the 
employee will  estimate pension wealth at greatly in  excess of  current 
vested benefits. This employee, like the employee whose child is about to 
enter college, is in line to receive a disproportionate share of the equity 
claim of the employee group in the next year. Third, the group model of 
compensation implies that the surplus in the pension fund-plan  assets 
less the present value of  accrued benefits-is  owned in part by the firm 
and in part by the employees. 
The employees tradeoff  current compensation for future compensa- 
tion when they receive a promise of a pension. In our model, compensa- 
tion is not as well defined: employees may be buying and selling equity 
rights as well as receiving the value of their marginal products. In a simple 
model of  compensation, employees are just price takers, without  any 
need to acquire experience with the firm. The trade-offs between current 
salary and a pension can be explained by using a defined contribution 
pension plan. In this plan, the employee gives up a dollar of current salary 
(before tax); this dollar is invested  in  a fund, such as a mutual fund 
(a CREF  or a TIAA account). The retirement benefits of employees are 
uncertain to the extent of the risk they take in their investment account 
and up to changes in their marginal tax rate in the pre- and postretirement 
period. The firm acts as an agent, dividing salary between a check for the 
employee  and a check for  the retirement account; for the firm’s tax 
purposes, the division of salary is irrelevant. Employees make their own 
funding  and  plan  choices  based  on  current and  future consumption 
trade-offs, as well as the desire to assume risk. There is ample evidence 
that employees desire some risk  in their pension  accounts: university 
professors, presumably a representative group, albeit more risk averse, 
have  placed  approximately half  of  their  defined contribution  account 
money in common stocks, CREF, and the remainder in risky bonds and 
in  risky  mortgages,  TIAA. For  university  professors,  these  pension 
accounts may represent the largest fraction of their savings in the form of 
stocks or bonds  and, as explained in  Miller  and  Scholes (1978), the 
contribution limits are so generous that professors may not need to hold 
common stock for retirement other than in their CREF account. 
In early work, it was assumed that pension promise was like a bond 
contract, a nominal but definite promise to the employees of the firm. If 
there were some probability of defaulting on the bonds of the firm, the 
pension claim was of equal priority to these bonds. This assumption is not 
correct  for several important reasons.  On  a strict  termination  basis, 
bondholders have a higher priority on the assets outside the fund; em- 
ployees have a higher priority on the assets inside the fund. Assets in the 
fund increase the security of  the pension claims of  the employees. If  to 
some extent, prior to  ERISA. employers could  use  the assets in  the 
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more difficult for the firm’s stockholders to obtain the surplus of the fund 
upon its termination. Furthermore, in our model, the employees own 
part of the surplus of the fund-group  negotiations and ERISA give them 
increased bargaining power to obtain part of  the surplus of  the pension 
fund with and without plan termination. By analogy, just as bondholders 
seldom  receive  what  their  covenants  entitle  them  to  in  bankruptcy, 
stockholders seldom receive what their covenants entitle them to in a 
plan termination. 
The pension fund is not a savings account of the stockholders of  the 
firm. Most corporate pension funds invest in bonds and stocks. Approx- 
imately 60% of the assets of pension funds are invested in common stock. 
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981), however, suggest that investing pension 
fund assets in bonds dominates these current investment policies. They 
assume that the pension fund and the pension promise are separate: the 
fund is an asset of the firm, the promise is a liability of the firm. Given this 
assumption, the stockholders are better off  if the pension fund invests in 
bonds: (1) in the Black model, because the firm can keep its equity risk 
the same by substituting bonds for stocks in the fund and by leveraging by 
buying  back  common  stock  with  newly  issued  bonds  on  corporate 
account-the  bonds in the fund earn at the before-tax rate, while the 
offsetting bonds on corporate account require payments at the after-tax 
rate; (2) in the Tepper model, individual investors offset, on their own 
account, the change in the risk of their equity that results from substitut- 
ing bonds for stocks in  the pension fund. Both models use the Miller 
(1977) tax model-the  equilibrium marginal after-tax rate of  corpora- 
tions is equal to the after-tax rate of  individuals.  Miller  and  Scholes 
(1981) and Bulow (1981) examine the crucial assumption of  the inde- 
pendence of the assets in the pension plan from the promise of  pension 
benefits to employees. 
The tax models assume that employees do not  make claims on the 
assets of the pension fund. If, in the extreme case, the bondholders and 
stockholders of the firm believed that the entire pension fund was owned 
by the employees, there would be no tax advantage to the firm to funding 
in bonds. The collateral security for the loan would be bad. With partial 
claims on the assets of the pension fund. the collateral security would be 
tainted. The equity model implies that the collateral security, if not bad, 
is at least tainted. With complicated equity claims on the assets of the 
pension  fund, it might  be  difficult to write bond  contracts that allow 
bondholders to extract the surplus in the pension plan to pay off debt 
claims. 
As in Bulow et al. (1983), the Employees Retirement Income Security 
Act and the establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
changed the economics of the defined-benefit pension plan. If there were 
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the corporate account or to overfund the pension fund to obtain tax 
advangtages, ERISA has reduced these opportunities. Since employees, 
with claims on the assets of  the pension fund, do not have redeemable 
claims, the PBGC serves to monitor the actions of corporate stockholders 
to preserve the rights of the pension beneficiaries. These property rights, 
and  the power  of  the PBGC to enforce  them, make it  difficult  and 
uncertain how to use the assets of  the fund as collateral security on loan. 
Even employees in retirement look to the PBGC to secure rights to the 
assets of  the fund. 
Because it is possible to change the level of funding in the pension plan 
to some extent, as long as it is done slowly or without large changes, there 
is still a tax advantage to overfunding the pension plan. On the other 
hand, this implies that with large unanticipated changes in the circum- 
stances of  the firm, or with changes in the ERISA rules, the collateral 
security of  the pension fund may be claimed by other than the bondhold- 
ers of the firm. 
That employees share an equity ownership in the firm may explain 
some of  the other  anomalies.  Group negotiations  prevent  unilateral 
changes in interest rate assumptions that change the value of  lump sum 
distributions. By thinking of the employees as negotiating as a group, we 
can understand and interpret the anomalous provisions of  retirement 
plans, such as the early retirement and the lump sum payout provisions. 
1.5  Conclusion 
The assets of the pension fund are not necessarily the assets of the firm. 
This makes the question, “Who owns the assets in  a defined-benefit 
pension plan?” more uncertain than if the assets were assets of  the firm or 
if the fund were a defined-contribution plan and the assets belonged to 
the  employees.  In  the  augmented  balance  sheet  model  of  pension 
finance, the stockholders own the assets in the pension plan. In the group 
model, the employees and the stockholders share ownership of  these 
assets. 
The employees,  managing and running the firm, negotiate with the 
stockholders  for a wage package; the wage package is distributed among 
the employees as current salary and as future pension (and other bene- 
fits). In part, the total wage is used by some members of the group to buy 
equity and to make investments from other members of the group. 
To some extent, the stockholders of the firm may be able to overfund 
the pension fund to capture some tax advantages. By changing funding 
assumptions, employers adjust their contributions to the pension fund. It 
is unlikely, however, that the PBGC will allow large changes in the fund 
or in the company without notification; it is unlikely that pension bene- 
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pension trust. In recent years, many companies, trying to change pension 
or corporate benefit  policies, have  been  challenged by  pension  benc- 
ficiaries. 
To  use the pension trust as collateral for a loan is difficult for all but the 
most secure companies. No contract can be drafted; the claim must be a 
general obligation of the firm. The firm could change its policies at any 
time;  pension  beneficiaries  and the PBGC could  step in between  the 
bondholders and the assets of the fund. The collateral security of the fund 
is bad or tainted. The stockholders would find it difficult to borrow on the 
assets on which others have a partial claim, namely, the pension  bene- 
ficiaries. 
With modern corporations, outside stockholders are risk takers and 
expect to be compensated for assuming capital risk. As Fama (1980) has 
argued, the internal management team, or employee group, is separate 
from the stockholders, other than through the board of  directors of  the 
firm. As long as stockholders earn a competitive rate of  return on their 
holdings within the firm and the correct share of any new rents through 
investment, the shareholders are indifferent to how employees monitor 
each other within the firm. In the context of  the large corporation, the 
pension  plan  could not  be used  as a device to monitor the actions of 
employees; in particular, for the young employee the pension plan is of 
little if  any value. 
The vast majority of large pension funds contain assets far in excess of 
the accrued benefits of the plan beneficiaries. A literal interpretation of 
pension covenants implies that the entire surplus within the fund belongs 
to  the stockholders. We  have  seen, however, that  if  employees  can 
negotiate as a group and if the provisions of ERISA are ambiguous as to 
whether the employees or the stockholders own the surplus, we cannot 
give a unique answer to the question, Who owns the assets in the pension 
plan? 
Comment  Jerry Green 
This  is  a very  valuable  contribution to the discussion  about pension 
funding and the appropriate way to form  firms’ balance sheets in the 
presence of  pension liabilities. It makes a single argument: the assets in 
the pension  plan  should be at least partially  attributed to the pension 
beneficiaries  because they have an implicit equity claim on the surplus 
generated by the firm, including the surplus in the pension  account. In 
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addition, this chapter contains interesting discussion of pension-related 
issues, good factual material, and a review of the earlier work on ERISA 
by Bulow and on  the integration of individual pension firm balance sheets 
by Scholes, Black, Tepper, and others. 
This discussion will be organized  as follows.  First  I will  review the 
factual basis used by Bulow and Scholes for their main argument, then I 
will go over the Theoretical aspects of their model, and finally I will offer 
my own comments. 
Bulow and Scholes claim that many pensions grant extra increases to 
retirees, although not legally obligated to do  so. This makes a prima facie 
case for their equity in the plan. They also cite two specific cases. The 
retirees of Grumman Corporation sued the plan for maladministration of 
its assets and were able to exert significant pressure in this respect, and, 
when  the plan  of  the A&P Corporation terminated,  the assets  were 
divided  and not kept entirely within the company. 
In these cases the identifiability of workers with the firm meant that any 
action taken by the plan had implications, rational or not, for the expecta- 
tions  of  current workers with  respect  to the future behavior  of  their 
employer. For example, in granting extra benefits to retirees, workers 
might justifiably believe that such benefits would be granted in the future, 
when they are retired, and therefore that their current wage demands 
could be reduced. I doubt if the same type of argument would apply to 
multiemployer plans because of the lack of close association between the 
administration of  the plan and the locus of  employment of the workers. 
More generally, labor market studies have shown that comparably skilled 
workers earn higher wages in industries that are healthier, growing faster, 
or cyclically stronger. In short, the labor market is not perfectly competi- 
tive, and human capital immobility or nontransferability is probably only 
a part of the story. Clearly, therefore, that part of  compensation due to 
pension arrangements displays characteristics similar to the wage compo- 
nent. 
On a theoretical level, Bulow and Scholes justify this behavior as the 
result of an implicit contract between the collectivity of workers and their 
employer. That is, it is the result of  a bargaining agreement with  two 
parties, in contrast to much of  the implicit  contracts literature, which 
treats the individual  worker in  long-term  relationships  with  his firm. 
While it is true that any bargaining theory, at this level of  generality, will 
lead to some form of  “split the surplus,” we are given neither an extensive 
form of  the bargaining game nor enough information  about the prop- 
erties of  the agreement to tie down exactly which point is achieved. 
Finally,  I  would  like  to offer  my  comments on the Bulow-Scholes 
resolution  of  the paradox of  aggregation in valuing pension  liabilities. 
They assert that the liability of  the corporation is the current level of 
vested  benefits,  whereas the pension  asset  of  individuals  is generally 
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benefits  in the future which  are not yet vested, but which  should be 
counted in the present value of  receipts from the plan. Their resolution is 
inconsistent with their general view of  these plans as part of  a long-term 
relationship in which the firm has a reputation at stake. The reason for 
valuing the liability at only the level of  vested benefits is that the firm has 
an option of terminating the plan and recovering all assets in excess of the 
vested benefit level. (I am speaking here about well-funded plans.) But 
one  must remember that the firm has its reputation at stake; indeed, that 
is  why so many vastly overfunded plans continue, and only the rare 
exception is terminated. 
I would say therefore that at the individual level, in a world of  perfect 
certainty, the correct value for the pension asset is the present value of 
the benefits to be received. As the individual ages, this increases because 
future benefits are discounted  less. In the prcsencc of  various kinds of 
uncertainties, this calculation  has to be modified.  In my opinion  the 
principal modification is to introduce the option value that a worker has 
in remaining  with his present employer. Those workers who have a better 
opportunity later, an opportunity which would cause them to lose some 
future benefits in their current plan, will weigh the value of  such a move 
against the benefits to be forgone. Therefore, being employed by a firm 
entails a certain option, namely, the option to continue, and it is this 
option whose value must be at least equal to the future benefits to be 
received. even in excess of  the vested level. 
For a large firm in a relatively stable industry, individual firm leaving 
averages out. Therefore, the level of  liability associated with  a certain 
plan can be computed as the present value of the payments to be received 
by plan beneficiaries, reduced to the extent that there is some statistical 
attrition of  this population. 
In summary, Bulow and Scholes offer some fascinating discussion, but 
I  feel  that it  is  slightly  at cross-purposes  with  itself.  The long-term 
contracts/human capital view of pension valuation explains the sharing of 
fortunes  that is observed. It does lead us to the view that, in a significant 
way, the  workers have an  equity  claim on the firm, because the firm seeks 
to maintain its reputation as a “fair employer.” But this very argument 
undermines the balance sheet calculation that the authors offer in con- 
nection with the aggregation paradox of  pension valuation. 
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